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Introduction to clarithmetic III
Giorgi Japaridze
Abstract
The present paper constructs three new systems of clarithmetic (arithmetic based on computability
logic): CLA8, CLA9 and CLA10. SystemCLA8 is shown to be sound and extensionally complete with
respect to PA-provably recursive time computability. This is in the sense that an arithmetical problem
A has a τ -time solution for some PA-provably recursive function τ iff A is represented by some theorem
of CLA8. System CLA9 is shown to be sound and intensionally complete with respect to constructively
PA-provable computability. This is in the sense that a sentence X is a theorem of CLA9 iff, for some
particular machine M, PA proves that M computes (the problem represented by) X. And system
CLA10 is shown to be sound and intensionally complete with respect to not-necessarily-constructively
PA-provable computability. This means that a sentence X is a theorem of CLA10 iff PA proves that
X is computable, even if PA does not “know” of any particular machine M that computes X.
MSC: primary: 03F50; secondary: 03F30; 03D75; 68Q10; 68T27; 68T30
Keywords: Computability logic; Interactive computation; Game semantics; Peano arithmetic; Constructive
theories
1 Introduction
Being a continuation of [2] and [4], this article relies on the terminology, notation, conventions and technical
results of its predecessors, with which the reader is assumed to be well familiar. While the present paper
is not self-contained, the entire “Introduction to clarithmetic” series is so, and can be read without prior
familiarity with computability logic (CoL), which serves as a logical basis for all theories elaborated in the
series.
The previously constructed systems CLA4, CLA5, CLA6 and CLA7 form a sequence of incremen-
tally powerful theories, sound and extensionally complete with respect to polynomial time computability,
polynomial space computability, elementary recursive time (=space) computability, and primitive recursive
time (=space) computability, respectively. Continuing that pattern, the present paper introduces three new,
incrementally strong (and stronger than their predecessors) theories CLA8, CLA9 and CLA10.
A natural extreme beyond primitive recursive time is PA-provably recursive time (which can be easily
seen to be equivalent to PA-provably recursive space). That means considering PA-provably recursive
functions instead of primitive recursive functions as time complexity bounds for computational problems.
Our present theory CLA8 turns out to be sound and complete with respect to PA-provably recursive time
computability in the same sense as CLA7 is sound and complete with respect to primitive recursive time
computability. Remember that, on top of the standard Peano axioms, CLA7 had the single extra-Peano
axiom ⊓x⊔y(y = x+ 1), and its only nonlogical rule of inference, termed “CLA7-Induction”, was
F (0) F (x)→ F (x+ 1)
F (x)
,
with no restrictions on F (x). CLA8 augments CLA7 through the following single additional rule
F (x) ⊔ ¬F (x) ∃xF (x)
⊔xF (x)
, (1)
where F (x) is elementary. A justification for this rule is that, if we know how to decide the predicate F (x)
(the left premise), and we also know that the predicate is true of at least one number (the right premise),
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then we can apply the decision procedure to F (0), F (1), F (2), . . . until a number n is hit such that the
procedure finds F (n) true, after which the conclusion ⊔xF (x) can be solved by choosing n for x in it.
The story does not end with provably recursive time computability though. Not all computable problems
have recursive (let alone provably so) time complexity bounds. In other words, not all computable problems
are recursive time computable. An example is
⊓x
(
∃yp(x, y)→⊔yp(x, y)
)
, (2)
where p(x, y) is a decidable binary predicate such that the unary predicate ∃yp(x, y) is undecidable (for
instance, p(x, y) means “Turing machine x halts within y steps”). Problem (2) is solved by the following
effective strategy: Wait till Environment chooses a value m for x. After that, for n = 0, 1, 2, . . ., figure out
whether p(m,n) is true. If and when you find an n such that p(m,n) is true, choose n for y in the consequent
and retire. On the other hand, if there was a recursive bound τ for the time complexity of a solution M
of (2), then the following would be a decision procedure for (the undecidable) ∃yp(x, y): Given an input m
(in the role of y), run M for τ(|m| + 1) steps in the scenario where Environment chooses m for x at the
very beginning of the play of (2), and does not make any further moves. If, during this time, M chooses a
number n for y in the consequent of (2) such that p(m,n) is true, accept; otherwise reject.1
A next natural step on the road of constructing incrementally strong clarithmetical theories for incre-
mentally weak concepts of computability is to go beyond PA-provably recursive time computability and
consider the weaker concept of constructively PA-provable computability of (the problem represented by) a
sentence X . The latter means existence of a machine M such that PA proves that M computes X , even
if the running time of M is not bounded by any recursive function. System CLA9 turns out to be sound
and complete with respect to this sort of computability. That is, a sentence X is provable in CLA9 if and
only if it is constructively PA-provably computable. Deductively, CLA9 only differs from CLA8 in that,
instead of (1), it has the following, stronger, rule:
F (x) ⊔ ¬F (x)
∃xF (x)→⊔xF (x)
, (3)
where F (x) is elementary. Note that (3) merely “modifies” (1) by changing the status of ∃xF (x) from being
a premise of the rule to being an antecedent of the conclusion. A justification for (3) is that, if we know how
to decide the predicate F (x), then we can apply the decision procedure to F (0), F (1), F (2), . . . until (if and
when) a number n is hit such that the procedure finds F (n) true, after which the conclusion can be solved
by choosing n for x in its consequent. Note that, unlike the earlier-outlined strategy for (1), the present
strategy may look for n forever, and thus never make a move. This, however, only happens when ∃xF (x) is
false, in which case the conclusion is automatically won.
A further weaker concept of (simply) PA-provable computability is obtained from that of constructively
PA-provable computability by dropping the “constructiveness” condition. Namely, PA-provable computabil-
ity of a sentence X means that PA proves that a machineM solving X exists, yet without necessarily being
able to prove “M solves X” for any particular machine M. An example of a sentence that is PA-provably
computable yet not constructively so is S ⊔ ¬S, where S is an elementary sentence with PA 6⊢ S and
PA 6⊢ ¬S, such as Go¨del’s sentence. Let L be a machine that chooses the left disjunct of S ⊔ ¬S and retires.
Similarly, let R be a machine that chooses the right disjunct and retires. One of these two machines is a
solution of S ⊔ ¬S, and, of course, PA “knows” this. Yet, PA does not “know” which one of them is a
solution (otherwise either S or ¬S would be provable); nor does it have a similar sort of “knowledge” for
any other particular machine.
A system sound and complete with respect to PA-provable computability is CLA10. It augments CLA9
through the following additional rule:
∃xF (x)
⊔xF (x)
, (4)
where the premise is an elementary sentence. The admissibility of this rule, simply allowing us to change ∃x
to ⊔x, is obvious in view of the restriction that ∃xF (x) is a sentence (that is, F (x) contains no free variables
1An alternative solution: Figure out whether there is a number n with |n| ≤ τ(|m| + 1) such that p(m,n) is true. If yes,
accept; otherwise reject.
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other than x). Indeed, if an x satisfying F (x) exists, then it can as well be “computed” (generated), even if
we do not know what particular machine “computes” it. As we remember, systems CLA4-CLA7 are sound
in a strong, constructive sense. Specifically, there is an effective (in fact, efficient) procedure for extracting
solutions from proofs. The same strong form of soundness holds for CLA8 and CLA9 as well. CLA10
stands out as the only system whose soundness theorem is not (and cannot be) constructive. Namely, while
CLA10-provability of a sentence X implies that X has an algorithmic solution, generally there is no effective
way to extract a particular solution from a proof of X .
2 Technical preliminaries
All terminology and notation not redefined in this paper has the same meaning as in [2, 4]. And all of our old
conventions from [2, 4] extend to the present context as well. Namely, as in [4], a “sentence” always means
a sentence (closed formula) of the language of CLA4. Similarly for “formula”, unless otherwise specified or
suggested by the context. Also, where n is a natural number, the standard term for n means 0 followed
by n “ ′”s (e.g., 0 ′ ′ ′ is the standard term for 3). We may not always be very careful about terminologically
or notationally differentiating between a number and the standard term for it.
As a binary predicate of the variable X over HPMs and the variable X over sentences, “X wins X” is
not arithmetical (is not expressible in the language of PA), for otherwise so would be the truth predicate
for elementary sentences: such a sentence is true iff it is won by an HPM that makes no moves. Remember
from Section 14.3 of [2] that, on the other hand, for any particular sentence X , the (now unary) predicate
“X wins X” is arithmetical. Throughout this paper, for each sentence X , we assume the presence of a
fixed elementary formula WX(x) naturally representing such a predicate, and when we say something like
“PA proves that X wins X”, what we precisely mean is that PA ⊢ WX(pXq), where pXq is the standard
term for the code of X . Or, if we say “PA proves that X is computable”, what we precisely mean is that
PA ⊢ ∃xWX(x).
The soundness proofs found in this article rely on the following lemma. In it, a clarithmetical sequent
means a sequent E1, . . . , En ◦–E0 where each Ei (0 ≤ i ≤ n) is a sentence (of the language of CLA4).
Lemma 2.1 There is an efficient procedure that takes an arbitrary CL12-proof of an arbitrary clarithmeti-
cal sequent E1, . . . , En ◦–F and constructs an n-ary GHPM M such that PA proves that, for any n-ary
GHPMs N1, . . . ,Nn, if each Ni(pN1q, . . . , pNnq) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a solution of Ei, then M(pN1q, . . . , pNnq)
is a solution of F .
Proof. If the phrase “PA proves that” is deleted in the present lemma, we get nothing but a
weak/simplified version of Theorem 10.1 of [2], which, in turn, is a reproduction of Theorem 10.5 of [3].
An analysis of the proof of the latter, combined with some basic experience in working with PA, reveals
that the latter can be formalized in PA in the form required by our present lemma.
3 CLA8, a theory of PA-provably recursive time computability
The language of each of the theories CLA8, CLA9 and CLA10 introduced in this paper is the same as that
of any other system of clarithmetic constructed in the present series of articles — that is, it is an extension
of the language of PA through the additional binary connectives ⊓ , ⊔ and quantifiers ⊓,⊔.
The axiomatization of CLA8 is obtained from that of CLA7 by adding the single new rule of inference,
which we call Finite Search (FS):
⊓
(
F (x) ⊔ ¬F (x)
)
⊓∃xF (x)
⊓⊔xF (x)
,
where F (x) is any elementary formula.2
2The forthcoming soundness theorem for CLA8 would just as well go through without the requirement that F (x) is ele-
mentary. But why bother: completeness can be achieved even with the present, restricted, form of FS.
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To summarize, the nonlogical axioms of CLA8 are those of PA (Axioms 1-7 from Section 11 of [2]) plus
one single additional axiom ⊓x⊔y(y = x ′) (Axiom 8). There are no logical axioms. The only logical rule
of inference is Logical Consequence (LC) as defined in Section 10 of [2], and the only nonlogical rules of
inference are FS and CLA7-Induction
⊓F (0) ⊓
(
F (x)→ F (x ′)
)
⊓F (x)
.
We fix
T(x, y, z, t)
as a standard formula of the language of PA saying that Turing machine (encoded by) x, on input y, at
computation step z, halts with output t. By an explicit PA-provably recursive function we mean a
natural number τ such that, where pτq is the standard term for it, PA ⊢ ∀y∃z∃tT(pτq, y, z, t). Context
permitting, we usually identify such a number τ or term pτq with the (unary) function computed by the
Turing machine encoded by τ . When τ is an explicit PA-provably recursive function and a given HPM M
runs in time τ , we say that τ is an explicit PA-provably recursive bound for the time complexity of
M; whenever such a τ exists, we say that M is a PA-provably recursive time machine.
Theorem 3.1 An arithmetical problem has a PA-provably recursive time solution iff it is provable in CLA8.
Furthermore, there is an efficient procedure that takes an arbitrary extended CLA8-proof of an arbitrary
sentence X and constructs a solution of X (of X†, that is) together with an explicit PA-provably recursive
bound for its time complexity.
3.1 Proof of the soundness part of Theorem 3.1
Consider any sentence X with a fixed extended CLA8-proof. Our goal is to construct a PA-provably
recursive time HPM M such that M wins X and, furthermore, PA proves that M wins X . We shall not
explicitly address the question on the efficiency of our construction, because it is achieved the same way as
in all previous soundness proofs. That is, as in the similar proofs of [4], we will limit ourselves to verifying
the pre-“furthermore” part of the theorem.
We proceed by induction on the length of the proof of X . In each case of our induction, we show how
to construct the above-mentioned HPM M, together with a recursive function τ , and present an informal
proof of the fact that M solves X in time τ . A reader sufficiently familiar with PA will immediately see
that such a proof can be reproduced in PA.
The case of X being an axiom is simple and is handled in the same way as in the earlier soundness
proofs. So is the case of X being derived by LC, only now it relies on Lemma 2.1 instead of the earlier
relied-upon Theorem 10.1 of [2] (= Theorem 10.5 of [3]). The case of X being obtained by CLA7-Induction
is essentially handled in the way as in the soundness proof for CLA7 found in [4], only with the words
“primitive recursive” replaced by “PA-provably recursive”.
So, the only case worth considering is that of X being derived by FS. Assume X is (the ⊓-closure)
of ⊔xF (x), and thus its premises are (the ⊓-closures of) F (x) ⊔ ¬F (x) and ∃xF (x). By the induction
hypothesis, there is an HPM N that solves F (x) ⊔ ¬F (x). Similarly for the other premise ∃xF (x) but, since
the latter is elementary, its solvability (that is, the solvability of ⊓∃xF (x)) simply means that ∀∃xF (x) is
true.
To describe our purported solution M of ⊔xF (x), assume x,~v are exactly the free variables of F (x), so
that F (x) can be rewritten as F (x,~v). For simplicity, we rule out the trivial case of F (x) having no free
occurrences of x. At the beginning, M waits for Environment to choose constants for the free variables ~v
of ⊔xF (x,~v). Assume ~c are the constants chosen for ~v. From now on, we shall write F ′(x) for F (x,~c).
Further, where i is a natural number, we shall write Ni for the machine that works just like N does in the
scenario where the adversary, at the beginning of the play, has chosen the constant i for the variable x and
the constants ~c for the variables ~v. So, Ni wins the constant game F
′(i) ⊔ ¬F ′(i).
Environment’s initial moves bring the original ⊓⊔xF (x) down to ⊔xF ′(x). The goal of M now is to
win ⊔xF ′(x). It achieves this goal by creating a record i, initializing it to 0, and then acting as prescribed
by the following procedure:
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Procedure LOOP: Simulate Ni until it chooses one of the two ⊔ -disjuncts of F ′(i) ⊔ ¬F ′(i). If the right
disjunct is chosen, increment i by 1 and repeat LOOP. Otherwise, if the left disjunct is chosen, specify x as
i in the (real) play of ⊔xF ′(x), and retire.
Since ∃xF ′(x) is true, sooner or later the above procedure hits an i such that the simulated Ni chooses
the left disjunct of F ′(i) ⊔ ¬F ′(i), meaning that F ′(i) is true. This guarantees that M wins. A bound τ
for the time complexity of M is computed by a Turing machine that follows the work of M and counts the
steps that it performs before making a move. Such a function τ is PA-provably recursive because, as already
noted, our entire argument can be reproduced in PA.
3.2 Proof of the completeness part of Theorem 3.1
Consider an arbitrary sentence X , an arbitrary HPM X , and an arbitrary explicit PA-provably recursive
function χ such that X is a χ time solution of X . Let pχq be the standard term for (the code of) χ. We
fix some enumeration of pairs of natural numbers and, where a is a natural number, denote the first (resp.
second) element of the ath pair by (a)1 (resp. (a)2). We treat (x)1, (x)2 as pseudoterms and assume that
the above enumeration is “standard enough”, so that the functions (x)1 and (x)2 are primitive recursive and
PA proves
∀
(
∃z1∃z2T
(
x, y, z1, z2
)
↔ ∃zT
(
x, y, (z)1, (z)2
))
(5)
(E ↔ F abbreviates (E→ F ) ∧ (F →E)). The function χ will also be treated as a pseudoterm. Namely, if
we write z = χ(x) within a formal expression, it is to be understood as an abbreviation of ∃yT
(
pχq, x, y, z).
That χ is an explicit PA-provably recursive function, by definition, means that PA proves
∀y∃z1∃z2T(pχq, y, z1, z2). (6)
In CLA8, from (5) and (6), by LC we get
⊓∃zT
(
pχq, y, (z)1, (z)2
)
. (7)
It is obvious that PA constructively proves (in the sense of Section 11 of [4]) the primitive recursive time
computability of
⊓
(
T
(
pχq, y, (z)1, (z)2
)
⊔ ¬T
(
pχq, y, (z)1, (z)2
))
. (8)
Therefore, by Theorem 11.2 of [4], CLA7 proves (8), and hence so does CLA8 because the latter is an
extension of the former.
From (8) and (7), by FS, we get ⊓⊔zT
(
pχq, y, (z)1, (z)2
)
which, together with (5), by LC, can be easily
seen to imply
CLA8 ⊢ ⊔z
(
z = χ(x)
)
. (9)
The rest of our completeness proof for CLA8 is literally the same as the completeness proof for CLA6
found in Section 7 of [4], with the only difference that now χ is a PA-provably recursive (rather than
elementary recursive) function; also, where Section 7 of [4] relied on Fact 7.2, now we rely on (9) instead.
3.3 The intensional strength of CLA8
We say that PA constructively proves the PA-provably recursive time computability of a sentence
X iff, for some particular HPM X and some particular explicit PA-provably recursive function χ, PA proves
that X is a χ-time solution of X .
The following theorem holds for virtually the same reasons as the similar Theorem 16.2 of [2] for CLA4
or Theorem 11.2 of [4] for CLA5, CLA6 and CLA7:
Theorem 3.2 Let X be any sentence such that PA constructively proves the PA-provably recursive time
computability of X. Then CLA8 proves X.
Remark 3.3 From our soundness proof for CLA8 it is immediately clear that the above theorem, in fact,
holds in the stronger, “if and only if” form. The same can be seen to be the case for Theorem 16.2 of [2]
and Theorem 11.2 of [4].
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4 CLA9, a theory of constructively PA-provable computability
Deductively, CLA9 only differs from CLA8 in that, instead of the FS rule of the latter, CLA9 has the
following rule, which we call Infinite Search (IS):
⊓
(
F (x) ⊔ ¬F (x)
)
⊓
(
∃xF (x)→⊔xF (x)
) ,
where F (x) is any elementary formula.
Let X be a sentence. We say that PA constructively proves the computability of X iff, for some
HPM X , PA proves that X wins X .
Notice that, while our earlier defined concepts of polynomial, elementary recursive, primitive recursive
and PA-provably recursive time (or space) computabilities are extensional in their nature, the concept
of constructively PA-provable computability is intensional. To be precise, the former are properties of
computational problems while the latter is a property of sentences. An extensional version of this concept
could be defined by saying that a computational problem A is constructively PA-provably computable in
the extensional sense iff there is a sentence X with X† = A (X “represents” A) such that X is constructively
PA-provably computable in the intensional sense. The forthcoming Theorem 4.1 can be easily seen to
continue to hold after replacing the intensional concept of constructively PA-provable computability by its
extensional counterpart.3 Yet, doing so would significantly and unnecessarily weaken the theorem. This is
the reason why, in the present context, we have opted for only considering the intensional concept. A similar
comment applies to the concept of (not-necessarily-constructively) PA-provable computability defined later
in Section 5.
Theorem 4.1 For any sentence X, CLA9 proves X iff PA constructively proves the computability of X.
Furthermore, there is an efficient procedure that takes an arbitrary extended CLA9-proof of an arbitrary
sentence X and constructs an HPM X such that PA proves that X is a solution of X (of X†, that is).
4.1 Proof of the soundness part of Theorem 4.1
As in the earlier soundness proofs, we will limit ourselves to verifying the pre-“furthermore” part. Consider
any sentence X with a fixed extended CLA9-proof. We proceed by induction on the length of the proof of
X . In each case of the induction, we (show how to) construct an HPM M and present an informal proof of
the fact that M solves X . It will be immediately clear that such a proof can be reproduced in PA.
The case of X being an axiom is simple and is handled as in the soundness proof for CLA8. So is the case
of X being derived by LC. So is the case of X being derived by CLA7-Induction — namely, it is essentially
handled in the same way as in the soundness proof for CLA7 found in [4], but is, in fact, simpler, because
we no longer need to care about complexity.
Finally, assume X is (the ⊓-closure of) ∃xF (x)→⊔xF (x), obtained by IS from (the ⊓-closure of)
F (x) ⊔ ¬F (x). By the induction hypothesis, we know how to construct a solution N of F (x) ⊔ ¬F (x).
Here we assume that x occurs free in F (x) (otherwise the case is straightforward), and that ~v are all the
additional free variables of F (x). So, F (x) can be rewritten as F (x,~v). We let M — the purported solution
of ∃xF (x)→⊔xF (x) — be a machine that, at the beginning of the play, waits till Environment chooses
constants ~c for the variables ~v. Let F ′(x) stand for F (x,~c) and, for each natural number i, let Ni be an
HPM that plays F (x) ⊔ ¬F (x) just as N does in the scenario where, at the very beginning of the play, the
adversary chose the constant i for the variable x and the constants ~c for the variables ~v.
After the above event of Environment having chosen constants for all free variables, thus having brought
the original game ⊓
(
∃xF (x)→⊔xF (x)
)
down to ∃xF ′(x)→⊔xF ′(x), M creates a record i, initializes it to
0, and then acts as prescribed by the following procedure:
Procedure LOOP: Simulate Ni until it chooses one of the two ⊔ -disjuncts of F ′(i) ⊔ ¬F ′(i). If the right
disjunct is chosen, increment i by 1 and repeat LOOP. Otherwise, if the left disjunct is chosen, specify x as
i in the consequent of ∃xF ′(x)→⊔xF ′(x), and retire.
3On the other hand, Theorem 3.1 and similar theorems from [2, 4] — namely, their completeness parts — would fail with
the intensional counterparts of the corresponding extensional concepts of computability.
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If ∃xF ′(x) is false, ∃xF ′(x)→⊔xF ′(x) is (automatically) won by M. And if ∃xF ′(x) is true, sooner or
later the above procedure hits an i such that the simulated Ni chooses the left disjunct of F ′(i) ⊔ ¬F ′(i);
then, again, M wins, because it brings the consequent of ∃xF ′(x)→⊔xF ′(x) down to the true F ′(i).
4.2 Proof of the completeness part of Theorem 4.1
Consider an arbitrary sentence X and an arbitrary HPM X . Let L be an elementary sentence saying “X
does not win X”, so that ¬L says “X wins X”. Our intermediate — and main — goal is to show that
CLA9 ⊢ ¬L→X (Lemma 4.4), from which the desired completeness of CLA9 follows almost immediately.
For the purposes of the subsequent section, it is important to note that, at this point, we are not making
any assumptions about X and X . In particular, we are not assuming that X wins X , let alone that PA
proves so; such an assumption will be made only later, after Lemma 4.4 is proven.
By a computation history we shall mean a finite initial segment of some computation branch of X .
The way we encode configurations of X is described in Appendix A.1 of [2]. That encoding extends to
computation histories as finite sequences of configurations in a standard way. For readability, we will often
identify configuration histories with their codes and say something like “a is a computation history” when
what is precisely meant is “a is the code of a computation history”. We may further identify such an a with
the standard term for it.
Remember from Section 14.5 of [2] that, where Φ is a legal position of X , the yield of Φ means the game
〈Φ〉X . So, the type of the “yield” function in [2] is {positions} × {games} −→ {games}. Here, for safety, we
need an “intensional” version of this concept/function, whose type is {positions} × {CL12-formulas} −→
{CL12-formulas}. Namely, let F be a closed CL12-formula containing no predicate letters other than =,
and no function letters other than ′,+,× (F is not necessarily a sentence of the language of CLA9 because
it may contain constants other than 0). And let Φ be a legal position of F (of F †, that is). Then, in the
context of F , the intensional version of the yield of Φ, denoted by 〈Φ〉!F , is defined inductively as follows:
• 〈〉!F = F (remember that 〈〉 means the empty run).
• For any nonempty legal position 〈λ,Ψ〉 of F (where λ is a labmove and Ψ is a sequence of labmoves):
– If λ signifies a choice of a component Gi in an occurrence of a subformula G0 ⊔G1 or G0 ⊓G1 of
F , and F ′ is the result of replacing that occurrence by Gi in F , then 〈λ,Ψ〉!F = 〈Ψ〉!F ′.
– If λ signifies a choice of a constant c for a variable x in an occurrence of a subformula ⊔xG(x)
or ⊓xG(x) of F , and F ′ is the result of replacing that occurrence by G(c) in F , then 〈λ,Ψ〉!F =
〈Ψ〉!F ′.
Let E(~s) be a formula all of whose free variables are among ~s (but not necessarily vice versa), and let z
be a variable not among ~s. We will write E˜(z, ~s) to denote an elementary formula whose free variables are z
and those of E(~s), and which is a natural arithmetization of the predicate that, for any constants a,~c in the
roles of z, ~s, holds (that is, E˜(a,~c) is true) iff a is a computation history and, where Φ is the position spelled
on the run tape of the last configuration of that history, Φ is a legal position of X with 〈Φ〉!X = E(~c).
Let y be a variable and E be a formula not containing y. As in Section 14.6 of [2], we say that a formula
H is a (⊥, y)-development of E iff H is the result of replacing in E:
• either a surface occurrence of a subformula F0 ⊓ F1 by Fi (i = 0 or i = 1),
• or a surface occurrence of a subformula ⊓xF (x) by F (y).
(⊤, y)-development is defined in the same way, only with ⊔ ,⊔ instead of ⊓ ,⊓.
Lemma 4.2 Assume E(~s) is a formula all of whose free variables are among ~s, and y, z are variables not
occurring in E(~s). Then:
(a) CLA9 proves E˜(z, ~s) ⊔ ¬E˜(z, ~s).
(b) For every (⊥, y)-development Hi(y,~s) of E(~s), CLA9 proves E˜(z, ~s)→⊔uH˜i(u, y, ~s).
(c) Where H1(y,~s), . . . , Hn(y,~s) are all of the (⊤, y)-developments of E(~s), CLA9 proves
¬L ∧ E˜(z, ~s) ∧ ¬‖E(~s)‖→⊔u⊔yH˜1(u, y, ~s) ⊔ . . . ⊔⊔u⊔yH˜n(u, y, ~s). (10)
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Proof. Clause (a): Observe that the predicate E˜(z, ~s) is primitive recursive and, furthermore, PA
obviously constructively proves the primitive recursive time computability of E˜(z, ~s) ⊔ ¬E˜(z, ~s). Hence, by
Theorem 11.2 of [4], CLA7 proves E˜(z, ~s) ⊔ ¬E˜(z, ~s). Therefore, of course, so does CLA9.
Clause (b): Pick any one of the (⊥, y)-developments Hi(y,~s) of E(~s). By clause (a) of the present lemma
with Hi(y,~s) in the role of E(~s) and u in the role of z, CLA9 proves H˜i(u, y, ~s) ⊔ ¬H˜i(u, y, ~s), whence, by
Infinite Search, CLA9 also proves
∃uH˜i(u, y, ~s)→⊔uH˜i(u, y, ~s). (11)
Consider any (∀) values of y and ~s, and assume E˜(z, ~s) is true. Hi(y,~s) is the game to which E(~s) is
brought down by a certain labmove ⊥α. Let u be the result of appending such a labmove ⊥α to the run-tape
content of the last configuration of z. Then, obviously, H˜i(u, y, ~s) is true. To summarize, we have just found
that, if E˜(z, ~s) is true, then so is ∃uH˜i(u, y, ~s).
Of course, the argument of the preceding paragraph is formalizable in PA, which implies the (PA- and
hence) CLA9-provability of ∀
(
E˜(z, ~s)→ ∃uH˜i(u, y, ~s)
)
. But, as it is not hard to see, for any formula F , ⊓F
is a logical consequence of ∀F . Hence, the sentence ⊓
(
E˜(z, ~s)→ ∃uH˜i(u, y, ~s)
)
is also provable in CLA9,
which is the same as to say that CLA9 proves
E˜(z, ~s)→ ∃uH˜i(u, y, ~s). (12)
Now, the target E˜(z, ~s)→⊔uH˜i(u, y, ~s) can be seen to be a logical consequence of (11) and (12), which
makes it provable in CLA9.
Clause (c): Unlike our handling of clauses (a) and (b) that involved some explicit metareasoning, for
both brevity and diversity, in the present case we the higher-level approach of informally (but formalizably)
reasoning directly in CLA9.
So, to justify (10), argue in CLA9. Assume ¬L, E˜(z, ~s) and ¬‖E(~s)‖. Consider the scenario where
Environment does not move in any configuration starting from the last configuration of z. If X does not move
either, it can be seen to lose, because E(~s) is the final position reached in the play and its elementarization
‖E(~s)‖, by our assumption, is false. But our assumption ¬L means that X cannot lose. So, sooner or later,
X will move. Let us call the computation history that extends z to the point when the above event of
X moving happens magical. Thus, a magical computation history exists in the sense of ∃. Also, for any
particular computation history u, we can obviously tell — in the sense of ⊔ — whether u is magical or not.4
Hence, by Infinite Search, a magical computation history exists not only in the sense of ∃, but also in the
sense of ⊔. That is, it can be actually found/computed. So, let m be such a magical computation history.
From m, we can further find, in the sense of ⊔, the particular move α that X made in the above-described
scenario, i.e., in the scenario represented by m. This α must be legal, or else X would (but cannot) lose. If
so, α brings E(~s) down to Hi(n,~s) for a certain n and certain (⊤, y)-development Hi(y,~s) of E(~s). Again,
such i and n not only exist, but can be actually found. Now, we can win (10) by choosing the ⊔ -disjunct
⊔u⊔yH˜i(u, y, ~s) in the consequent, and then, in it, specifying u as m and y as n.
Lemma 4.3 Assume z, ~s are pairwise distinct variables, and E(~s) is a formula all of whose free variables
are among ~s. Then
CLA9 ⊢ ¬L ∧ E˜(z, ~s)→E(~s).
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the complexity of E(~s). Pick a fresh variable y. By the
induction hypothesis, for any (⊥, y)- or (⊤, y)-development Hi(y,~s) of E(~s) (if there are any), CLA9 proves
¬L ∧ H˜i(u, y, ~s)→Hi(y,~s). (13)
Argue in CLA9 to justify ¬L ∧ E˜(z, ~s)→E(~s). Consider any values (constants) b and ~a chosen by
Environment for z and ~s, respectively.5 Throughout the rest of this argument, assume both ¬L and E˜(b,~a)
are true (otherwise we win). We need to see how to win E(~a).
4After all, the predicate of “being magical” is primitive recursive, so CLA7 is sufficient to decide it.
5Here, unlike the earlier followed practice, for safety, we are reluctant to use the names z and ~s for those constants.
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To solve E(~a), we bring the resource (10) down to
¬L ∧ E˜(b,~a) ∧ ¬‖E(~a)‖→⊔u⊔yH˜1(u, y,~a) ⊔ . . . ⊔⊔u⊔yH˜n(u, y,~a).
Since the ¬L and E˜(b,~a) components of the above are true, in fact, the following resource is at our disposal:
¬‖E(~a)‖→⊔u⊔yH˜1(u, y,~a) ⊔ . . . ⊔⊔u⊔yH˜n(u, y,~a). (14)
We wait till one of the following two events takes place:
Event 1: Environment makes a move α in E(~a). We may assume that this move is legal. Then, for one of
the (⊥, y)-developments Hi(y,~s) of E(~s) and some constant c, the labmove ⊥α brings E(~a) down to Hi(c,~a).
So, now it remains to see how to win Hi(c,~a). In view of clause (b) of Lemma 4.2 and the truth of E˜(b,~a),
the resource ⊔uH˜i(u, c,~a) is at our disposal. Using it, we find a d with H˜i(d, c,~a). Now we bring (13) down
to ¬L ∧ H˜i(d, c,~a)→Hi(c,~a). Since the antecedent of this resource is true, it provides a sought way to win
Hi(c,~a).
Event 2: The provider of (14) brings it down to
¬‖E(~a)‖→ H˜i(d, c,~a). (15)
for one of i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and some constants d, c. Using clause (a) of Lemma 4.2, we check whether H˜i(d, c,~a)
is true. If not, ‖E(~a)‖ is guaranteed to be true (otherwise (15) would be lost by its provider), and we continue
waiting for Event 1 to occur: if such an event never occurs, the truth of ‖E(~a)‖ obviously means that we win.
Suppose now H˜i(d, c,~a) is true. Then, just as in the case of Event 1, (13) provides a way to win Hi(c,~a).
We make the move that brings E(~a) down to Hi(c,~a), and follow the just-mentioned way.
If neither event happens, then ‖E(~a)‖ is true (otherwise (14) would be lost by its provider) and, again,
we win.
Lemma 4.4 CLA9 ⊢ ¬L→X.
Proof. Let a be the code of the empty computation history, and aˆ be the standard term for a. Of
course, PA and hence CLA9 proves X˜(aˆ). In view of Fact 12.6 of [2], CLA9 proves ⊔z(z = aˆ). By Lemma
4.3, CLA9 also proves ⊓z
(
¬L ∧ X˜(z)→X
)
. These three can be seen to imply ¬L→X by LC.
Now we are ready to claim the target result of this section. Suppose PA constructively proves the
computability of X . We may assume that it proves “X solves X” for the earlier-fixed (yet arbitrary) HPM
X . In other words, PA ⊢ ¬L. Hence CLA9 ⊢ ¬L. Then, in view of Lemma 4.4, CLA9 ⊢ X , as desired.
5 CLA10, a theory of PA-provable computability
CLA10 only differs from CLA9 in that it has the following additional rule of inference, called Construc-
tivization:
∃xF (x)
⊔xF (x)
,
where F (x) is any elementary6 formula containing no free variables other than x.
Let X be a sentence. We say that PA proves the computability of X iff PA proves that there is (∃)
an HPM that wins X .
Theorem 5.1 For any sentence X, CLA10 proves X iff PA proves the computability of X.
6Just as in the case of CLA8, the requirement that F (x) is elementary can be dropped here without affecting the soundness
of the system.
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5.1 Proof of the soundness part of Theorem 5.1
As always, this part of the theorem is verified by induction on the length of the proof of X . The cases where
X is an axiom, or is derived by LC or IS, are handled in the same way as in the soundness proof for CLA9.
Here we shall only look at the case of X being derived by Constructivization. So, assume X is ⊔xF (x),
where F (x) is an elementary formula not containing any free variables other than x, and ⊔xF (x) is derived
from ∃xF (x) by Constructivization. By the induction hypothesis, PA proves that ∃xF (x) is “computable”
which, as F (x) is elementary, simply means that ∃xF (x) is true. So, PA ⊢ ∃xF (x).
Argue in PA. Since ∃xF (x) is true, there is a number a such that F (a) is true. Then the target ⊔xF (x)
is solved by an HPM M that makes a as its only move in the play and retires. We (PA, that is) cannot
name such an M because we do not know what number a exactly is; yet we know that M exists. In other
words, we know that X is computable.
5.2 Proof of the completeness part of Theorem 5.1
Consider an arbitrary sentence X . Let L(x) be a natural formalization of the predicate “x is (the code of)
an HPM which does not win X”. Remember that, in Section 4.2, X was a fixed yet arbitrary HPM. And
note that the sentence L of Section 4.2 was nothing but what we can now write as L(pXq). So, Lemma 4.4
can now be re-stated as
CLA9 ⊢ ¬L(pXq)→X. (16)
Further observe that, while X was fixed in Section 4.2, the proof of Lemma 4.4 given there goes through
with X as a (⊓-quantified) variable; more precisely, (16), in fact, holds in the following, stronger form:
CLA9 ⊢ ⊓x
(
¬L(x)→X
)
. (17)
By LC, (17) implies
CLA9 ⊢ ⊔x¬L(x)→X. (18)
Assume now PA proves that X is computable. In other words, PA ⊢ ∃x¬L(x). Then, by Constructivization,
CLA10 ⊢ ⊔x¬L(x). But then, in view of (18), CLA10 ⊢ X , as desired.
References
[1] G. Japaridze. Towards applied theories based on computability logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 75
(2010), pp. 565-601.
[2] G. Japaridze. Introduction to clarithmetic I. Information and Computation 209 (2011), pp. 1312-
1354.
[3] G. Japaridze. A logical basis for constructive systems. Journal of Logic and Computation 22 (2012),
pp. 605-642.
[4] G. Japaridze. Introduction to clarithmetic II. Manuscript at http://arxiv.org/abs/1004.3236
10
